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I. INTRODUCTION
Beginning on January 31, 2000, atleast 100,000 cubic meters of
highly polluted water escaped from a tailings dam at the Aurul
gold mine in Baia Mare, Romania.' The water flowed into the
Somes, Tisza, and Danube Rivers, causing enormous environ-
mental damage. Most of the damage occurred in Hungary, down-
stream from Baia Mare. Hungarian politicians called the spill
"the first, most serious environment[al] catastrophe in the 21s'
century," 2 and "the worst ecological disaster in central Europe
since Chernobyl in 1986."
3
More striking than the resemblance to the Chernobyl disaster,
though, was the resemblance to another 1986 environmental ca-
tastrophe: the Sandoz warehouse fire at Schweizerhalle, near
Basel, Switzerland, which released over 10,000 cubic meters of
highly contaminated water into the Rhine.4 In each of these in-
stances, an international environmental legal regime ostensibly
protected the affected river system. However, international law
failed to prevent or reduce the impact of the accident in each
case.
Fourteen years after the Sandoz spill, Europe's river systems
remain unacceptably vulnerable to catastrophic chemical acci-
dents. This article explores the growth of the environmental re-
gime of one such system, the Danube basin, and the weaknesses
revealed by the Baia Mare accident.
II. THE BAIA MARE ACCIDENT AND RELATED INCIDENTS
A. Baia Mare
Baia Mare is located in northern Romania near the borders
of Hungary and Ukraine. West of Baia Mare, the Somes River
flows across the border into Hungary, where it joins the Tisza.
See Eszter Szamado, Cyanide Spill is Ecological Crisis: Hungarian Official, AGENCE
FRANCE PRESSE, Feb. 12, 2000 (statement of Zoltna Illes, President of Hungarian parlia-
ment's environment committee).
2 Simon Mann, Angry Hungary Demands Compensation, SYDNEY (Aus.) MORNING
HERALD, Feb. 10, 2000, at 8 (statement of Hungarian Interior Ministry official Gabor
Horvath), available at 2000 WL 2310756 [hereinafter Mann !].
3 Szamado, supra note 1.
4 See Note, Aaron Schwabach, The Sandoz Spill: The Failure of International Law to
Protect the Rhine from Pollution, 16 ECOLOGY L.Q. 443, 445 (1989) (citing SANDOZ LTD.,
SCHWEIZERHALLE: THE FIRE ON 1 NOVEMBER 1986 AND ITS AFTERMATH 4, 14 (1987))
[hereinafter Sandoz Spill].
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The Tisza denotes the Romania-Ukraine border north of Baia
Mare. To the east of Baia Mare, between the town of Baia
Borsa and the border, the Vaser River flows into the Viseu,
which joins the Tisza at the border.'
The Aurul mine at Baia Mare was one of many in northern
Romania. When fully operational, the Aurul mine might have
produced 50,000 ounces of gold and 250,000 ounces of silver per
year.' Ownership of the Aurul mine is evenly divided between
the Romanian and Australian partners in the venture.7 The
Romanian government owns Remin, the Romanian partner.'
The directors of the Australian partner, Esmeralda Exploration
Ltd., hold 25 % of the mining company's shares.9
Tailings from the mine are collected behind a tailings dam. 0
The tailings are mixed with a cyanide solution to aid in extract-
ing the metal from the ore." During the month of January, ice
and snow built up on the dam, causing water levels behind the
dam to rise to levels higher than normal. 12 There is still some
dispute as to the date and cause of the dam failure, but on
January 30 or 31, the water overtopped the dam or the dam
burst. 3 For the next four to five days, water containing cyanide
and heavy metals flowed over the dam into the local creek sys-
tem, and from there into the Somes (known in Hungary as the
Szamos). 4 As noted, the Somes joins the Tisza in Hungary.
The Tisza flows through Hungary and (very briefly) Slovakia
and Ukraine, before entering Yugoslavia and joining the Da-
nube upstream from Belgrade. 5 The polluted water thus ended
5 See, e.g., EUROMAP, ROMANIA, MOLDAVIA (map) (1999).
6 Mann I, supra note 2.
7 Esmeralda owns 50% of Aurul S.A., which owns the Aurul S.A. Tailings Retreatment
Project at Baia Mare. See Australian Stock Exchange Company Announcements, Mar. 15,
2000,2000 WL 16709113.
8 Mann i, supra note 2.
9 See Karen Middleton & Sharon Kemp, How It Happened, THE WEST AUSTRALIAN,
Feb. 10, 2000, at 4, 2000 WL 6251420.
11) "Tailings" are "residue separated in the preparation of various products (as grains or
ores)." WEBSTERS NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1202 (1986).
11 See Death on the Danube, ECONOMIST, Feb. 19-25, 2000, at 53.
12 See Middleton, supra note 9.
13 Esmeralda Chairman Brett Montgomery maintains that there was an overflow, rather
than structural failure of the dam. See Middleton, supra note 9.
14 See Middleton & Kemp, supra note 9. See also Trevor Sykes, A Fishy Side to the
Great Hungarian Cyanide Hysteria, AUSTRALIAN FINANCIAL REV., Feb. 12, 2000, at 14,
available at 2000 WL 3977245.
15 See The Balkans, NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC, Feb. 2000 (map insert) [hereinafter The
Balkans].
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up in the Hungarian portion of the Tisza.
After the accident, a water monitoring station at Szolnok in
Hungary measured cyanide levels more than 700 times the usual
amounts. 6 Nine days later, the levels were still twenty-eight times
the maximum safe level. 7 The Hungarian authorities banned
fishing and all contact with the water of the Somes; it appears that
all animal life in the Hungarian section of the Somes was killed. 8
The spill continued to move downstream with the current, con-
taminating the Tisza, which provides drinking water for two mil-
lion Hungarians. Some industrial facilities were closed and
authorities provided schools and hospitals with distilled water. 9
Near Csongrad, far downstream from the accident, cyanide
levels were twenty times the allowed maximum."' Emergency
services blocked the river with barges and filled railway cars with
dead fish scooped from the river.2' One Hungarian leader said of
the river, "It is as if a neutron bomb had been detonated. All the
living organisms have been destroyed. '2  By February 11, the spill
had reached the border between Hungary and Yugoslavia.23
Yugoslav authorities reported an initial cyanide level of 0.13 mil-
ligrams per liter, falling to .07 milligrams per liter later in the
day.24 Serbian authorities prohibited use of the waters of the
Tisza (known in Yugoslavia as the Tisa).25 Serbian environment
minister Branislaw Blazic declared, "The Tisza has been mur-
dered .... This is an absolute catastrophe. 26
By February 19, the Tisza was almost entirely lifeless over the
nearly 1,000 kilometer stretch between the Somes and the Da-
nube. Hungarian and Yugoslavian workers had removed more
16 See Mann 1, supra note 2. See also Middleton & Kemp, supra note 9 ("800 times the
acceptable level").
17 See Mann I, supra note 2.
18 See Middleton & Kemp, supra note 9.
19 See Mann I, supra note 2.
21 See Romanian Cyanide Spill a "European Catastrophe", AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE,
Feb. 10, 2000, available at 2000 WL 2730898 [hereinafter European Catastrophe].
21 See id.
22 Szamado, supra note 1 (statement of Zoltna Illes).
23 See id.
24 See id. Professor Bozo Dalmacija of the University of Novi Sad (in Yugoslavia)
stated that 0.1 mg/ is the maximum amount considered safe. Four and one half milligrams
of cyanide (or 45 liters of water with the maximum "safe" concentration) will kill a human;
much smaller amounts will kill fish. See id.
25 See id.
26 Fred Bridgland, Nothing Is Alive. Zero, SUNDAY HERALD, Feb. 20, 2000, at 13,
available at 2000 WL 4100629.
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than 100 metric tons of fish from the Tisza.27 Many of the 15,000
people employed by the fishing industry hung black banners from
their houses and bridges.28
Damage to the Danube, a much larger river, was less severe.
At the Iron Gates I Dam on the Yugoslav-Romanian border,
cyanide levels were still measurably above safe levels for fish.29
Thus, the "toxic bullet" of cyanide and poisonous metals, after
causing destruction in four other states, returned to its state of
origin.-"
The damage to the Tisza had severe short-term economic and
environmental effects and may also have significant long-term ef-
fects. For example, the bed of the Tisza may remain contami-
nated with heavy metals for the next five years.3 In addition to
the destruction of the fishing industry and the contamination of
the river bed by heavy metals, some species of animals unique to
the Tisza may become extinct.
32
B. Other Spills
No watercourse disaster would be complete without a few ech-
oes. To some extent, a particularly serious spill serves to focus at-
tention on smaller spills that might otherwise be overlooked. Un-
scrupulous plant operators, however, may also take advantage of
the larger disaster to conceal smaller "accidental" releases of
wastes.
In northern Romania, a combination of heavy precipitation and
a period of unusually cold temperatures impounded large quanti-
ties of water. Rising temperatures then caused flooding through-
out the region. In combination with the region's mining industry,
which operates with smaller margins for safety than might be tol-
erated in some wealthier countries, this flooding contributed to at
least three serious toxic accidents.33
27 Death on the Danube, supra note 11.
28 See id; Bridgland, supra note 26.
29 See Cyanide Pollution in Danube Still Cause for Concern, M2 PRESSWIRE, Feb. 22,
2000, available at 2000 WL 12935372.
30 Bridgland, supra note 26.
31 See Death on the Danube, supra note 11.
32 See Mann 1, supra note 2.
33 See generally Romanian Mine Accidents: Environmental Disaster in Central Europe
(visited March 20, 2000) http://www.zpok.hu/-jfeiler/baiamare/index.htm. This website,
maintained by the Hungarian National Society of Conservationists and Friends of the
Earth, provides complete, frequently updated information about the spills and their ef-
fects. See id.
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Eastern Europe, of course, is an environmentally troubled re-
gion. Industrial towns such as Baia Mare have paid a serious
price for decades of poorly regulated development; the life expec-
tancy in Baia Mare is 63 years, six years less than the Romanian
average.4 In 1999, a release of toxic waste in Yugoslavia severely
damaged the Timok River, whose confluence with the Danube
marks the border between Yugoslavia, Romania, and Bulgaria."
After the Baia Mare spill, a smaller spill of cyanide from a north-
ern Romanian coal mine into the Somes added to the contamina-
tion?6 Two spills at a zinc and lead mine at Baia Borsa released
more than 20,000 tons of toxic sediment, containing heavy metals,
into the Vaser.37 The waste flowed into the Viseu and the Tisza
upstream from the Somes, contaminating parts of the river spared
from the Baia Mare spill.3 World Wide Fund for Nature spokes-
person Jan Korabov also made the Chernobyl comparison: "It
would not be an exaggeration to put what has happened here in
the past few weeks on a par with Chernobyl. ' 39 Korabov pointed
out that the effects of the Baia Borsa spills on river life might
have been far more catastrophic but for the fact that almost all of
the river life had been killed by the Baia Mare spill.40 Recogniz-
ing the continuing danger of such spills, Romanian environment
minister Romica Tomescu stated that 41 mines in Romania were
known to be in a dangerous condition.4'
C. Reactions to the Spill
While Hungary and Yugoslavia reacted with outrage, Esmer-
alda, the Australian mining company, reacted with almost com-
plete denial. Esmeralda chairman Brett Mongomery said that the
Hungarian government had "grossly exaggerated" the amount of
damage.42 Hungarian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Gabor
34 See Some Residents See a Choice of Dying of Hunger Now or From Effects of Pollu-
tion Later; Spills Reveal Danger Lurking in Polluted Region in Romania, ORLANDO
(FLA.) SENTINEL, Mar. 12,2000, at A-18 [hereinafter Danger Lurking].
35 See Death on the Danube, supra note 11.
36 See Mann 1, supra note 2.
37 See Another Mine Spill Poisons Rivers in Romania, Hungary, ENV'T NEWS SERV.,
Mar. 11, 2000, available in 2000 WL 7838254; Danger Lurking, supra note 34; Michael Lei-
dig, New Mine Disasters "Waiting in Wings," SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, Mar. 16,
2000, at 14, available at 2000 WL 14846236.
38 See The Balkans, supra note 15.
39 Leidig, supra note 37
4 "See id.
41 See id.
42 European Catastrophe, supra note 20.
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Horvath responded that "a person who calls a five-kilometer long
carpet of dead fish floating along the river 'grossly exaggerated' is
either genuinely unaware of the facts or wants to ignore them."43
Montgomery also said that the fish may have been killed by a
natural increase in the turbidity or salinity of the river." He re-
ferred to a conspiracy against Esmeralda and said he had not con-
sidered the spill to be a major problem until he was contacted by
the Mining Protection Institute, who threatened to make the spill
"an international political issue."45
Esmeralda claimed that environmental standards in Romania
were at least as high as those in Australia. 6 Montgomery claimed
that Esmeralda was not liable for any damage caused by the spill,
because the site was owned by the Romanian company Aurul
S.A., which had "extensive insurance."47 He did not, however,
follow the example set in 1986 by then Sandoz director Hans
Winkler and make a public appearance to allow protesters to pelt
him with dead fish.48
Denial of reality is rarely a successful long-term strategy. On
February 10, 2000, the Australian Stock Exchange suspended
trading in Esmeralda's stock; the price by that point had fallen to
20 cents (Australian) per share.49 In March, the company volun-
tarily entered receivership, 0 provoking outrage in Hungary,5 and
was delisted from the stock exchange. 2
Australia found itself politically divided by the catastrophe.
While some sided with Esmeralda,53 Australia's Greens and
43 Id.
44 See Simon Mann et al., Warnings "Ignored" Before Cyanide Spill, SYDNEY (Aus.)
MORNING HERALD, Feb. 11, 2000, at 7, available at 2000 WL 2310919 [hereinafter Mann
II].
45 Id.
46 See Mann i, supra note 2.
47 Mann 1I, supra note 44.
48 See Sandoz Spill, supra note 4, at 451.
49 See Peter Gosnell, No Evidence on Europe Fish Kill, Australasian Business Intelli-
gence, THE DAILY TELEGRAPH (Aus.), Feb. 11,2000, available at 2000 WL 13993758.
50 See Martin Parry, Australian Miner in Voluntary Administration, AGENCE FRANCE
PRESSE, Mar. 16,2000, available at 2000 WL 2754188.
51 See, e.g., Australian Company Regrets Spill, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar. 17, 2000,
available at 2000 WL 16860358 (stating that Hungary planned to seek millions in compen-
sation from mine owners).
52 See id. (asserting that media coverage left the company with "no option" other than
to have its listing removed from the Australian Stock Exchange).
53 See generally, e.g., Sykes, supra note 14 (asserting that claims of the Hungarian gov-
ernment and environmentalists describing severe damage caused by the cyanide spill were
exaggerated and politically motivated).
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Democrats insisted that Australia's environmental laws should be
applied to Australian mining companies operating overseas-
4
Green Senator Bob Brown pointed out that such incidents dam-
aged Australia's prestige as well as the environment, while
Democrat Senator Andrew Bartlett agreed that "companies like
Esmeralda had proved [that] they could not behave like Austra-
lian ambassadors.... " Bartlett also stated, "There needs [sic] to
be binding codes of conduct and compulsory environmental
bonds to cover clean-up costs in the event of disasters such as
this," adding that "[n]on-binding codes of conduct clearly don't
work....""7 Australian Environment Minister Robert Hill, how-
ever, responded, "The Federal Government's position is that it's
up to other countries to set their own standards.
58
Hungary's Foreign Ministry announced that it would take "all
the possible diplomatic and legal steps to enforce Hungarian
compensation demands."59 Foreign Ministry spokesman Gabor
Horvath stated that "we will use international public law as well
as international private law to seek and claim restitution for
whatever damage has been done to my beautiful country." °
Horvath noted, however, that such relief would be sought against
Romania and Esmeralda, but not against Australia: "There is no
Australian state participation in the mine."'61 Serbian environ-
ment minister Branislaw Blazic announced a similar intention to
seek compensation. 2
Romania quickly distanced itself from Esmeralda. Romania's
deputy minister for environmental protection, Virgil Diaconu,
said "We have issued repeated written warnings over the past
year to the plant, asking [Esmeralda] to check again all their
technological equipment.613  Aurul was reportedly fined the
equivalent of $1,360 (Australian) for the accident.






0) Mann I, supra note 2.
61 European Catastrophe, supra note 20.
62 See Bridgland, supra note 26.
63 Mann If, supra note 44.
64 See Mann I. supra note 2. As of March 17, 2000, $1,360 Australian was equivalent to
$824.70 U.S. See Exchange Rates, WALL ST. J., Mar. 20, 2000, at C-13 ($1.00 (Aus.) was
worth 60.64 cents U.S. on Friday, Mar. 17, 2000).
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European Commission vice-president Loyola de Palacio
opined that the spill was "a true European catastrophe, '65 adding
that the European Union might offer financial assistance. She in-
voked the "polluter pays" principle, stating that "[t]here is a clear
principle in the EU that in general, who contaminates will pay for
the restitution, although full restitution here is impossible." In,
the aftermath of the-spill, arrangements were made for a United
Nations team to inspect the Baia Mare site in March 2000.67 Rec-
ognizing that the existing legal regime was inadequate to protect
the river, Romania and Hungary signed a protocol on the preven-
tion of environmental pollution at Debrecen, Hungary, on March
16, 2000.m
III. THE BAIA MARE SPILL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
The Baia Mare and Baia Borsa spills, like the 1986 Sandoz
spill, were classic cases of transboundary harm to an interna-
tional watercourse. In all three situations, an industrial accident
in the territory of an upper riparian caused harm to the water-
course in the territory of lower riparians. Over the past century,
international law dealing with such events has evolved consid-
erably, although significant gaps still exist. The Danube basin is
to some extent governed by a treaty regime, although gaps in
that regime may be filled by customary international law.
A. Sources of International Law
For purposes of this article it will be simplest to consider two
categories of international law. The first, conventional interna-
tional law, includes rules of law set out in written form and af-
firmatively agreed to by states. Treaties and other international
agreements fall in to this category. The second category is cus-
tomary law. In the absence of applicable conventional law, rules
of international law may be derived from "international custom,
as evidence of a general practice accepted as law."69 Customary
65 European Catastrophe, supra note 20.
66 Id.
67 See generally United Nations Environment Program, Cyanide Spill at Baia Mare, Ro-
mania (March 2000), at http://www.unep.ch/roe/baiamare.pdf (last visited August 31,
2000).
68 See id. At the time of this writing, the text of the Debrecen agreement was not avail-
able in English; E-mail from Zsuzsanna Kocsis-Kupper, legal adviser (environment), Re-
public of Hungary, to Aaron Schwabach, Mar. 21, 2000.
69 Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1), 59 Stat. 1055, 1060 (1945),
2000]
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law thus consists of those rules that, although not formalized by
international agreement, are followed by states out of a sense of
legal obligation. In addition to these two categories, "[g]eneral
principles of law" have traditionally been viewed as a third cate-
gory of public international law.70 However, they can also be seen
as "supplementary rules" or a "secondary source of law. ' 71 For
example, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most qualified
publicists are a "subsidiary means for the determination of rules
of law." 72 In any event, domestic judicial decisions and, to the ex-
tent that a state actually observes them, general principles of law
are state practice, and thus form the basis for normative expecta-
tions.
B. Treaties and International Agreements Protecting the Waters of
the Tisza and the Danube Basin
There is a considerable body of treaty law governing the uses of
the waters of the Danube basin, including the Somes, the Vaser,
and the Tisza. Many of these treaties are primarily concerned
with navigation, the defining of borders, and undertakings such as
the Iron Gates and Gabcikovo-Nagymaros projects. There are
also some specifically environmental agreements, as well as envi-
ronmental provisions in navigation treaties."
Prior to World War I, environmental preservation for its own
sake was rarely a goal of government policy in Europe or else-
where. Some Danube treaties from that period include quasi-
environmental provisions primarily intended to preserve the
river's navigability and to prevent the introduction of diseases
from Turkey to Europe.7 4
BBCJ: 20.4.5 (a)(ii) [hereinafter ICJ].
70 Id.
71 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 102(4) cmt. 1, Reporter's Note 7 (1987).
72 CJ, supra note 69.
73 For a detailed chronology of the Danube treaty regime, see Ludwik A. Teclaff, Fiat
or Custom: The Checkered Development of International Water Law, 31 NAT. RESOURCES
J. 45, 51-56 (1991). See also Pascale Costa, Les effets de la guerre sur les traites relatifs au
Danube, dans le cadre d'une etude globale du droit conventionnel du Danube, in THE
LEGAL REGIME OF INTERNATIONAL RIVERS AND LAKES/LE REGIME JURIDIQUE DES
FLEUVES AT DES LACS INTERNATIONAUX 203-45 (Ralph Zacklin & Lucius Caflisch eds.,
1981) (not available in English).
74 See, e.g., Public Act of the European Commission of the Danube Relative to the
Navigation of the Mouths of the Danube, Nov. 2, 1865, Annex A, art. LXIV, 131 Consol.
T.S. 399, 422-23 [hereinafter Public Act of 1865]; Regulations of Navigation and Police
Applicable to the Danube Between Galatz and the Mouths, Drawn up by the European
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After World War I, the political map of the Danube basin un-
derwent significant changes. Three major riparian states - the Ot-
toman Empire, the German Empire, and the Austro-Hungarian
Empire - ceased to exist. In their place appeared what twelve
years ago might still have been a recognizable political map of
Eastern Europe.
As with the pre-war treaties, the Treaties of Versailles and
Trianon made extensive provisions for the regime of navigation
on the Danube but said little about non-navigational uses of the
river." By 1921, the new navigation regime had been codified in
the Definitive Statute of the Danube.76 Although the post-war
treaties actually reflected less concern with quarantine and sani-
tary regulations," new non-navigational concerns began to ap-
pear. In particular, Article 293 of the Treaty of Trianon set up a
Hydraulic System Commission with jurisdiction over non-
navigational uses of much of the Danube basin.7" Article 293 was
a revolutionary document; it foreshadowed the drainage basin
approach to international watercourse administration, attempting
to create a single unified authority for non-navigational uses of an
entire (or almost entire) drainage basin.79
Article 293 also provided that "[a]ny disputes which may arise
out of the matters dealt with in this Article shall be settled as pro-
vided by the League of Nations.'"' 0 Later, the Treaty of Sinaia
Commission of the Danube, May 19, 1881, arts. 26, 73, 158 Consol. T.S. 245, 250-51, 259
[hereinafter European Commission Regulations of 1881] (restricting discharges of ballast
and cinders). For a detailed description of these restrictions, see Aaron Schwabach, Di-
verting the Danube: The Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Dispute and International Freshwater
Law, 14 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 290,314-17 (1996) [hereinafter Diverting the Danube].
75 Treaty of Peace With Germany, June 28, 1919, arts. 331-39 (dealing with navigable
international rivers generally), 346-53 (dealing with the Danube specifically), 225 Consol.
T.S. 189, 355-57, 360-61 [hereinafter Treaty of Versailles]; Treaty of Peace Between the
Allied and Associated Powers and Hungary, June 4, 1920, arts. 120 (surrendering the Da-
nube Flotilla), 275-91 (dealing with navigation on the Danube), 314 (binding Hungary to
adhere to treaties regarding international transport concluded by the Allied and Associ-
ated powers within the coming five years), S. Doc. No. 67-348, at 3539, 3666-70, 3670-71,
3679 (1923) [hereinafter Treaty of Trianon]. See also Treaty of Peace Between Austria-
Hungary, Bulgaria, Germany, Turkey, and Romania, May 7, 1918, arts. 24-26 (dealing with
the regime of navigation on the Danube), 223 Consol. T.S. 256, 263-64.
76 See Convention Instituting the Definitive Statute of the Danube, July 23, 1921, 26
L.N.T.S. 173 [hereinafter Definitive Statute].
77 See Treaty of Trianon, supra note 75, art. 274; Arrangement and Final Protocol Rela-
tive to the Exercise of the Powers of the European Commission of the Danube, Aug. 18,
1938, art. 12, 196 L.N.T.S. 113, 119 [hereinafter Treaty of Sinaia].
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provided for arbitration as well."' The post-war treaties thus an-
ticipated the need to resolve disputes arising from conflicting non-
navigational uses and from conflicts between navigational and
non-navigational uses. The Treaty of Trianon provided that the
tribunal resolving such conflicts would make "due allowance in its
decision for all rights in connection with irrigation, water-power,
fisheries and other national interests, which, with the consent of
all the riparian States or of all the States represented on the In-
ternational Commission, shall be given priority over the require-
ments of navigation." 2 Thus, Trianon represented a step in the
transition to a world in which rivers are primarily valued for their
non-navigational uses.
After World War II, however, the river system seems to have
declined in relative political importance. Whereas the Treaty of
Trianon devotes nineteen articles to the Danube, 3 the Treaty of
Paris contains a single, short "Clause Relating To The Danube,"
which provides that international traffic on the Danube should be
free and open to the nationals of all States. "
From 1945 to 1989, most of the lower Danube Basin was effec-
tively under the control of a single, relatively minor riparian state:
the Soviet Union. Thus, the post-war regime of navigation on the
river (which added little in the way of environmental provisions)
replaced the previous two-commission regime with a single-
commission system. 5 Furthermore, the old non-riparian partici-
pants in the navigation regime (Britain, France, and Italy) were
completely excluded from participation. 6  Other non-
environmental, Danube-specific treaties, which nonetheless con-
tained some environmental provisions, dealt with the Iron Gates
and Gabcikovo-Nagymaros projects. 7
81 Treaty of Sinaia, supra note 77, art. 21.
82 Treaty of Trianon, supra note 75, art. 282.
83 See id. arts. 274-293. In addition, Articles 268-73 discuss transit through Hungarian
territory (including transit on the Danube), and Articles 27, 30, and 31 relate to the Da-
nube and its tributaries as frontiers. Id. The Treaty of Versailles contains an additional 17
clauses relating to the Danube. Treaty of Versailles, supra note 75, arts. 331-39 (general
clauses relating to the Elbe, the Oder, the Niemen, and the Danube), 346-53 (special
clauses relating to the Danube).
.84 Treaty of Peace with Hungary, Feb. 10, 1947, art. 38, 41 U.N.T.S. 135, 208 (English
text begins on page 168) [hereinafter Treaty of Paris].
85 See Convention Regarding the Regime of Navigation on the Danube, Aug. 18, 1948,
33 U.N.T.S. 181 (English text begins at page 197) [hereinafter Belgrade Convention].
86 See id. (Britain, France, and Italy are not parties to the Convention).
87 See Agreement Concerning the Establishment of a River Administration in the Ra-
jka-Gonyu Sector of the Danube, Feb. 27, 1968, Czechoslovakia-Hung., 640 U.N.T.S. 50
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The post-war era also saw a dramatic increase worldwide in the
number of treaties dealing specifically with environmental con-
cerns. In 1958, the lower riparian states began efforts to protect
(English text begins at page 66); Treaty Concerning the Construction and Operation of the
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros System of Locks, Sept. 16, 1977, Czechoslovakia-Hung., 1109
U.N.T.S. 235, 32 I.L.M. 1247. The agreements concerning the Iron Gates project were
contained in twelve separate documents, all signed at Belgrade on November 30, 1963:
(1) Agreement Between the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Romanian
People's Republic Concerning the Construction and Operation of the Iron Gates Water
Power and Navigation System on the River Danube, Nov. 30, 1963, Rom.-Yugo., 512
U.N.T.S. 18 (English text begins at 512 U.N.T.S. 42).
(2) Convention Between the Government of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
and the Government of the Romanian People's Republic Concerning the Preparation of
Designs for the Iron Gates Water Power and Navigation System on the River Danube,
Nov. 30, 1963, Rom.-Yugo., 512 U.N.T.S. 68 (English text begins at 512 U.N.T.S. 94).
(3) Convention Between the Government of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
and the Government of the Romanian People's Republic Concerning the Execution of
Works for the Iron Gates Water Power and Navigation System on the River Danube, Nov.
30, 1963, Rom.-Yugo., 512 U.N.T.S. 124 [hereinafter Iron Gates Works Treaty] (English
text begins at 512 U.N.T.S. 152).
(4) Convention Between the Government of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
and the Government of the Romanian People's Republic Concerning Compensation for
Damage Caused by the Construction of the Iron Gates Water Power and Navigation Sys-
tem on the River Danube, Nov. 30, 1963, Rom.-Yugo., 512 U.N.T.S. 184 (English text be-
gins at 512 U.N.T.S. 208).
(5) Convention Between the Government of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
and the Government of the Romanian People's Republic Concerning The Determination
of the Value of Investments And Mutual Accounting In Connection with the Construction
of the Iron Gates Water Power and Navigation System on the River Danube, Nov. 30,
1963, Rom.-Yugo., 513 U.N.T.S. 6 (English text begins at 513 U.N.T.S. 56).
(6) Convention Between the Government of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
and the Government of the Romanian People's Republic Concerning The Operation of
the Iron Gates Water Power and Navigation System on the River Danube, Nov. 30, 1963,
Rom.-Yugo., 513 U.N.T.S. 110 (English text begins at 513 U.N.T.S. 126).
(7) The Statute of the Mixed Yugoslav-Romanian Commission for the Iron Gates, Nov.
30, 1963, Rom.-Yugo., 513 U.N.T.S. 144 (English text begins at 513 U.N.T.S. 154).
(8) Protocol Concerning Crossing of the Yugoslav-Romanian State Frontier in Connexion
With the Construction of the Iron Gates Water Power and Navigation System on the
River Danube, Nov. 30, 1963, Rom.-Yugo., 513 U.N.T.S. 166 (English text begins at 513
U.N.T.S. 184).
(9) Protocol Concerning the Settlement of Certain Questions in Connexion with the Con-
struction and Operation of the Iron Gates System, Nov. 30, 1963, Rom.-Yugo., 513
U.N.T.S. 208 (English text begins at 513 U.N.T.S. 220).
(10) Exchange of Letters Constituting an Agreement Concerning Credit, Noy. 30, 1963,
Rom.-Yugo., 513 U.N.T.S. 232 (English text begins at 513 U.N.T.S. 238).
(11) Exchange of Letters Constituting an Agreement Concerning the Adjustment of the
Frontier on the Danube, Nov. 30, 1963, Rom.-Yugo., 513 U.N.T.S. 244 (English text begins
at 513 U.N.T.S. 248).
(12) Final Act Relating to the Establishment and Operation of the Iron Gates Water Power and
Navigation System on the River Danube, Nov. 30, 1963, Rom.-Yugo., 512 U.N.T.S. 6 (English
text begins at 512 U.N.T.S. 12).
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fisheries in the Danube.8 Romania, Yugoslavia, 9 and the Soviet
Union were parties to the 1958 Fisheries Convention. Hungary
joined in 1961. 90 Articles 1 and 3 of the Convention defined the
area governed by the treaty in a way that would exclude almost
all of the Tisza and all of the tributaries of the Tisza affected by
the Romanian spills.91 The Danube itself and the Tisza at its junc-
tion with the Danube in Yugoslavia, however, would be covered
by the Convention. Under the Convention, Romania was obli-
gated "work out and apply measures to prevent the contamina-
tion and pollution of the river.., by... waste from industrial and
municipal undertakings which are harmful to fish and other
aquatic organisms.... "92 The spills themselves are evidence, how-
ever, that any such measures that might have existed in Romania
were either inadequate or improperly applied.
The Convention did create an obligation on the part of Roma-
nia toward Hungary. However, this obligation was not violated in
the Baia Mare and Baia Borsa spills, as none of the waters in
Hungary covered by the treaty were affected by the accident.93
The same was true of Ukraine, which is not a party to the treaty
and does not assume the responsibilities of the Soviet Union.
Those rights and responsibilities have passed to the Russian Fed-
eration."Y The state currently known as Yugoslavia is apparently
not a party either, though its status is less clear.9 If (as seems
likely) the contracting parties were forming obligations vis-A-vis
each other, rather than mutually agreeing to undertake some
88 See Convention Concerning Fishing in the Waters of the Danube, Jan. 29, 1958,
Bulg.-Rom.-U.S.S.R.-Yugo., 339 U.N.T.S. 23 (English text begins at page 58) [hereinafter
Danube Fisheries Convention].
89 The state then known as Yugoslavia was a party to the treaty. All other references to
Yugoslavia in this article are to the state presently using the name "Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia."
90 See CIESIN Basic Question 3: 'Which States Are Party to a Given Treaty',
http://globelaw.com/sources.htm.
91 Danube Fisheries Convention, supra note 88, arts. 1, 3. See generally The Balkans,
supra note 15.
92 Danube Fisheries Convention, supra note 88, art. 7.
93 See id. See generally The Balkans, supra note 15.
94 The Environmental Treaties and Resource Indicators database at the Center for In-
ternational Earth Science Information at Columbia University lists the present parties to
the treaty as Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, and Russia. See, e.g., Globelaw,
http://globelaw.com/sources.htm.
95 For a discussion of the difficulties in assessing the international legal rights and re-
sponsibilities of the successor states to the former Yugoslavia, see Paul R. Williams, The
Treaty Obligations of the Successor States of the Former Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and
Czechoslovakia: Do They Continue in Force? 23 DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 1 (1994).
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form of obligations erga omnes, Romania did not violate any ob-
ligation to Yugoslavia.
In the context of the Baia Mare and Baia Borsa spills, the
most significant treaties currently in force between Romania
and at least some of the affected downstream states are the
United Nations Convention on the Protection and Use of
Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes96 and the
Convention on Cooperation for the Protection and Sustainable
Use of the Danube River. 7
Romania, Hungary, Ukraine, and Slovakia are all parties to
the U.N. Convention.98 Under the U.N. Convention, Romania
is obligated to "take all appropriate measures ... to prevent,
control, and reduce pollution of waters causing or likely to
cause transboundary impact" 99 and to minimize the risk of acci-
dental pollution.'00 Romania failed to comply with these regula-
tions. The state should have required a more secure contain-
ment structure for the mine tailings, or perhaps required
monitoring of water buildup behind the tailings dam and ame-
liorative measures when the buildup reached a certain level.
Romania apparently did not, however, fail in its duty to warn
Hungary "about any critical situation that may have trans-
boundary impact,""1 although Ukraine and Hungary have ex-
pressed dissatisfaction over Romania's lack of communication
regarding the details of the accidents. 102
While the U.N. Convention incorporates the equitable use
9 31 I.L.M. 1312 (1992); 31 I.L.M. 1599 (1992), in force Oct. 6, 1996 [hereinafter U.N.
Convention]. Hungary approved the Convention on Sept. 2, 1994; Romania ratified on
May 31, 1995, and Slovakia and Ukraine acceded on July 7, 1999 and Oct. 8, 1999, respec-
tively. Yugoslavia is not a party. All four of the former states are also signatories to a
protocol on waterborne diseases, not yet in force. See 1999 Protocol on Water and Health
to the 1992 Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and
International Lakes, available at http://untreaty.un.org/English/notpub/27-5a-enng.htm;
information on signatories and ratification available at http://untreaty.un.org/
English/sample/EnglishlnternetBible/partl/chapterXXVII/treatyl9.asp.
97 Convention on Cooperation for the Protection and Sustainable Use of the Danube River
[hereinafter Danube Protection Convention], available at The University of Ljubljana,
http://ksh.fgg.uni-lj.si/danube//envconv/index.htm (entered into force Oct. 22, 1998). Hun-
gary, Romania, and Ukraine are all signatories to the Convention. See Globelaw,
http://globelaw.comlsources.htm.
98 See U.N. Convention, supra note 96.
99 U.N. Convention, supra note 96, arts. 2.2-2.2(a).
10 See id. art. 3.1(1).
101 Id. art. 14.
102 See generally Romanian Mine Accidents: Environmental Disaster in Central Europe,
at http://www.zpok.hu/-jfeiler/baiamare/index.htm.
2000]
Virginia Environmental Law Journal
concept, 103 it also incorporates the three canons by which much
of international environmental law is interpreted: the precau-
tionary principle, 14 the "polluter-pays" principle, 5 and the
principle of inter-generational equity.0 6 All of these principles,
however, tend to protect the environment at the expense of de-
velopment and, thus, work against Romania in the present
situation.
The U.N. Convention does not, however, make specific pro-
visions for liability or compensation in the event of trans-
boundary harm. For example, Article 7 (Responsibility and Li-
ability) provides only that, "The Parties shall support
appropriate international efforts to elaborate rules, criteria and
procedures in the field of responsibility and liability" without
elaborating on specific ways to achieve these goals. 0 7 Article 10
provides for consultations "between the Riparian Parties ... at
the request of any... Party,"'18 whereas Article 22 provides for
settlement of disputes "by negotiation or any other means of
dispute settlement acceptable to the parties to the dispute.'
' 9
Romania, Hungary, Ukraine, and Slovakia are all signatories
to the Convention on Cooperation for the Protection and Sus-
tainable Use of the Danube, and of the four, all but Ukraine
have ratified or otherwise become parties to the Convention,
which provides similar protections to the river, although with
greater specificity."0 The Convention also incorporates the pre-
cautionary and polluter-pays principles, although not the inter-
generational equity principle."' The Danube Protection Con-
vention is nonetheless 'greener' than the U.N. Convention, 12 as
103 See U.N. Convention, supra note 96, arts. 2.2(c), 3.
"04 See id. art. 2.5(a).
10 See id. art. 2.5(b).
"06 See id. art. 2.5(c).
"07 Id. art. 7.
108 Id. art. 10.
109 Id. art. 22.1. Article 22.2 provides for compulsory submission to the International
Court of Justice (ICJ) or arbitration if a nation declares in writing that it accepts one or
both of the means of dispute settlement. See id. art. 22.2. None of the states involved in
the current situation have made such a declaration.
110 See Danube River Protection Convention, http://www.rec.org/DanubePCU/
drpc.html.
II See Danube Protection Convention, supra note 97, art. 2(4); Annex I, Part 2.2. The
Convention also continues the functions of the 1985 Bucharest Declaration on the Coop-
eration of the Danubian Countries on Problems of Danubian Water Management. See id.,
art. 19.
112 See id. pmbl.
[Vol. 19:431
From Schweizerhalle to Baia Mare
it sets a standard of sustainable, rather than equitable, use. 113
It imposes similar duties to "prevent, control and reduce trans-
boundary impact" from pollution."14 For example, "Ore prepa-
ration" is specifically listed as a hazardous activity."5 There are
also duties to warn of accidental pollution,"6 and to consult with
affected lower riparians." 7 Romania's violation of or compli-
ance with these various provisions would be essentially the
same as under the U.N. Convention. The Danube Protection
Convention does, however, offer a stronger dispute resolution
mechanism. Article 24 of the Convention is worded somewhat
differently from Article 22 of the U.N. Convention, in a way
that suggests that acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction of the
ICJ or arbitration is the norm." 8 In order to accept compulsory
jurisdiction of the ICJ, however, parties must make an affirma-
tive declaration separate from the acceptance or ratification of
the treaty itself."9 Article 24 does provide for compulsory arbi-
tration where states have made no declaration and have not re-
solved a particular dispute within twelve months.20 Annex V
provides detailed arbitration guidelines. 2'
The Danube Protection Convention also sets up an Interna-
tional Commission for the Protection of the Danube River, 22
with binding rule-making powers within its area of compe-
tence. 123 The Commission began to operate on a provisional ba-
sis even before the Convention entered into force. On April 12,
1998, it undertook a project, "To promote the international co-
operation relating to an integrated approach to the manage-
ment of the Tisza River Basin," as well as "[t]o identify the joint
base for an Integrated Tisza River Basin Plan .... ,"I24 The proj-
ect was assigned to an Irish group, ESB International, and was
originally scheduled for completion on April 6, 2000.121
"3 See id. arts. 2(3), 2(5).
"4 See id. art. 5(1). See also arts. 5(2), 6(c).
115 Id. Annex I1, Part 1.1(c).
116 See id. arts. 16(3).
117 See id. arts 12(f), 11.
118 See id. art. 24(l).
"19 See id. arts. 24(2)(b), 24(2)(c).
120 See id. arts. 24(2)(a), 24(2)(e).
121 See id. Annex V.
122 See id. Annex IV.
123 See id. Annex IV, arts. 4, 5.
124 International Cooperation for River Basin Management in the Danube River Basin
http://www.rec.org/DanubePCU/flyers/coop-l.html (visited Mar. 22, 2000).
125 See id.
2000] 447
Virginia Environmental Law Journal [Vol. 19:431
Another convention that, if in force, would also be applicable
to the Baia Mare situation is the Espoo Convention on Envi-
ronmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context.'26
The Espoo Convention would require its parties to prepare envi-
ronmental impact assessment documentation for proposed activi-
ties that could have "significant adverse transboundary" effects.'27
Thus, Romania would have been obligated to require Aurul S.A.
to produce detailed, environmental impact, assessment documen-
tation.2 In addition, under the Espoo Convention, Romania
should have notified Hungary and invited it to participate. 29 Fur-
thermore, after the documentation was produced "without undue
delay," Romania should have entered into consultations with
Hungary concerning ways in which the adverse impact might be
reduced or eliminated.1'0 The Espoo Convention is not in force,
however, and the incomplete Danube treaty regime offers no
equivalent.
Overall, the treaty regime protecting the Danube is far less
comprehensive than that protecting Europe's other great interna-
tional river, the Rhine. 3' The Rhine treaty regime includes, inter
alia, a treaty creating a multinational Commission charged with
the protection of the river against pollution,'32 a treaty seeking to
protect the river from chemical pollution, with detailed lists of
prohibited and restricted pollutants,'33 and a convention dealing
with the specific problem of chloride pollution from the French
potassium mines in Alsace.13 There are also regional treaty
126 Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context,
Feb. 25, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 800 [hereinafter Espoo Convention]. Hungary, Romania,
Ukraine, and Slovakia are all signatories to the Convention but have not ratified it. See
Globelaw, httpJ/globelaw.com/sources.htm (naming the countries that have ratified the
treaty). By its terms, the Espoo Convention will enter into force ninety days after the six-
teenth instrument of ratification is deposited. See Espoo Convention art. 18.
127 Id. art. 2(2).
128 For a detailed description of the required documentation, see Espoo Convention,
arts. 1(vi), 2(7), 4, and Appendix 1I. See id.
129 See id. art.3.
130 Id. art. 5.
131 See Sandoz Spill, supra note 4, at 458-66.
132 See Vereinbarung uber die Internationale Kommission zum Schutze des Rheins ge-
gen Verunreinigung, Agreement on the International Commission for the Protection of
the Rhine Against Pollution, Apr. 29, 1963, 994 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force May 1,
1965).
133 See Convention for the Protection of the Rhine Against Chemical Pollution, Dec. 3,
1976, 16 I.L.M. 242, 253-55 (1977).
134 See Convention Relative a la Protection du Rhin Contre la Pollution par les
Chlorures, Convention on the Protection of the Rhine Against Pollution by Chlorides,
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commissions charged with protecting specific tributaries or re-
gions of the Rhine, such as the Saar, the Moselle, and Lake Con-
stance.'35 Also, unlike the Danube, the Rhine is largely protected
by European Union law, since most of the riparian states of the
Rhine are also members of the EU.
C. Customary International Law Governing the Use of the Waters
of Transboundary Watercourses
Although Romania evidently violated its obligations under the
U.N. Convention to Ukraine, Hungary, and Slovakia, it did not
violate its obligations to Yugoslavia. Romania may still have a
duty to Yugoslavia, however, under customary international law
since this body of law may fill any gaps in the set of rights and du-
ties defined by the U.N. Convention.
Customary international law has long recognized limits on the
discharge of pollutants into rivers. 136 The exact nature and extent
of those limits, however, are somewhat hard to determine. The
right of a downstream neighbor to receive an uninterrupted flow
of uncontaminated water must be balanced against the right of
the upper riparian to make equitable use of the river's waters.'37
The approach generally taken to balance the rights of lower
and upper riparian owners is one of limited territorial sover-
eignty.13 The territorial integrity interest of the lower riparian is
balanced against the territorial sovereignty interest of the upper
riparian. Limited territorial sovereignty is not fixed, however, but
is a movable point somewhere along a continuum between abso-
lute territorial sovereignty and absolute territorial integrity. Ro-
mania had both a sovereign right to exploit resources within its
territory and a duty to respect the territorial integrity of lower ri-
Dec. 3, 1976, 16 I.L.M. 265 (1977) (modified in 1991).
135 See generally Sandoz Spill, supra note 4, at 460.
136 This is a natural extension of the Trail Smelter principle (see note 133, infra, and ac-
companying text). One of the earlier declarations of this principle in the past century was
in the Donauversinkung case: "When utilizing an international watercourse in its territory,
every State is bound by the principle springing from the idea of the community of nations
based on international law: that it may not injure another member of the international
community." Johann G. Lammers, POLLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES
433-38 (1984) (discussing Donauversinkung case (Baden v. Wurttemberg), 116
Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts in Zivilsachen, Suppl. Entscheidungen des Staats-
gerichtshofs 18).
137 See Diverting the Danube, supra note 74, at 325-27.
138 For a full discussion of the competing approaches to this question, see generally Di-
verting the Danube, supra note 74, at 325-40 (indicating a lack of a high degree of norma-
tiveness by using the term "approach" instead of "rule").
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parians (such as Yugoslavia) by preventing or minimizing harm
from those activities. The exact amount of harm that an upper ri-
parian might be permitted to cause lower riparians is, of course,
likely to be a highly contentious matter, and has led many envi-
ronmentalists and scholars to embrace an alternative - the com-
munity theory.
A fourth approach to the management of international fresh-
water resources, the community or drainage basin management
theory,'39 has yet to find acceptance in the practice of states.
While theorists embrace the community theory, states are reluc-
tant to sacrifice their sovereignty to a drainage basin management
authority. Furthermore, most upper riparians seem to see the
community theory as a product of the environmental movement
and as more likely to protect the interests of downstream states.
The present situation in the Danube Basin is unusual because
many of the riparian states did not exist in their present form as
little as a decade ago. Thus, it is difficult to make any specific
predictions about the conduct of the riparian states based upon
their past conduct. In a broader sense, however, the practice of
the world's states in similar situations may provide a normative
framework within which to evaluate the responsibilities of Roma-
nia to Yugoslavia and the other lower riparians.
1. Decisions of International Tribunals
Basic principles of the customary international law of state re-
sponsibility for transboundary harm are generally seen as having
been developed through the Trail Smelter arbitration, 4' the Corfu
Channel Case,'4' and the Lake Lanoux Case.42 The Trail Smelter
139 Economic Commission for Europe Declaration of Policy on the Rational Use of Wa-
ter, Apr. 14, 1984, art. 17, ECE/DEC/C(XXXIX); Bellagio Draft Treaty Concerning the
Use of Transboundary Groundwaters, 1989, 1 BASIC DOCUMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 42 (Harald Hohmann ed. 1992). For annotated text and discus-
sion, see Robert D. Hayton & Albert E. Utton, Transboundary Groundwaters: The Bella-
gio Draft Treaty, 29 NAT. RESOURCES J. 663 (1989). See also Case Relating to the Terri-
torial Jurisdiction of the International Commission of the River Oder, 1929 P.C.I.J. (ser.
A) No. 23, at 27 (Sept. 10) (expressing the elements of the community theory); Agenda 21,
(vols. I-Il), §§18.9, 18.16, 18.35, 18.36, 18.38(g) U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (1992).
140 See Trail Smelter Arbitral Tribunal (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905 (1941), reprinted in
35 AM.J. INT'L L. 684 (1941).
141 See Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. AIb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 9) (determination on the
merits).
142 See Lake Lanoux Case (Spain v. Fr.), 12 R.I.A.A. 281 (1957), digested in 53 AM. J.
INT'L L. 156 (1959). Two decisions of international courts directly address Danube issues. See
Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, 37 I.L.M. 162 (1998); Jurisdiction of the
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tribunal, in dicta, first expressed the principle that a state has re-
sponsibility for environmental damage extending beyond its terri-
torial limits:
[N]o State has the right to use or permit the use of its territory
in such a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the terri-
tory of another or the properties or persons therein, when the
case is of serious consequence and the injury is established by
clear and convincing evidence.
43
In the Corfu Channel Case, the International Court of Justice also
applied this general principle of limited territorial sovereignty,
stating that it is "every State's obligation not to allow knowingly
its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other
States." 14 The Lake Lanoux arbitration applied the principle to
the non-navigational uses of a transboundary watercourse:
[T]he upstream State has, according to the rules of good
faith, the obligation to take into consideration the different in-
terests at stake, to strive to give them all satisfactions com-
patible with the pursuit of its own interests, and to demon-
strate that, on this subject, it has a real solicitude to reconcile
the interests of the other riparian with its own.
145
2. Aspirational Documents and Pronouncements of International
Bodies
Public and private international organizations have also ad-
dressed the problem of transboundary environmental harm.
While the aspirational documents thus produced create no legally
binding obligations, they may serve to show "the general princi-
ples of law recognized by civilized nations[.]"'46 To the extent that
they are promulgated (especially in the case of General Assembly
resolutions) by certain states and not by others, they may also
provide insight into the practice or expectations of those states.
European Commission of the Danube Between Galatz and Braila, Advisory Opinion, 1927
P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 14.
143 Trail Smelter Arbital Tribunal, supra note 140, at 716.
14 Corfu Channel Case, supra note 141, at 22.
145 Lac Lanoux Case, supra note 142, at 169.
146 See Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1), 59 Stat. 1055, 1060
(1945), T.S. No. 993, 3 Bevans 1153, 1976 U.N.Y.B. 1052.
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a. The Stockholm Declaration
Principle 21 of the United Nations' Stockholm Declaration on
the Human Environment1 47 is generally viewed as having attained
the status of customary international law. l4 Principle 21 provides
that states have "the sovereign right to exploit their own re-
sources pursuant to their own environmental policies ....
Along with this right, though, comes the "responsibility to ensure
that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause
damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the
limits of national jurisdiction."''  The Stockholm Declaration
thus incorporates the Corfu Channel standard that no state may
allow its territory to be used to harm another state.
b. The Helsinki Rules
The Helsinki Rules promulgated by the International Law As-
sociation also assume limited territorial sovereignty.' Article IV
of the Helsinki Rules states the "equitable use" concept: "Each
basin State is entitled, within its territory, to a reasonable and eq-
uitable share in the beneficial uses of the waters of an interna-
147 Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1, at 5, 11 I.L.M. 1416 (1972) [hereinafter Stockholm Declaration].
148 "The existence of the general obligation of States to ensure that activities within
their jurisdiction and control respect the environment of other States or of areas beyond
national control is now a part of the corpus of international law .... Advisory Opinion
on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 241-42 (July 8).
See also, e.g., Alexandre Kiss, The International Protection of the Environment, in THE
STRUCTURE AND PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1074-1075 (MacDonald et al. eds.
1983), cited in Prue Taylor, AN ECOLOGICAL APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL LAW:
RESPONDING TO CHALLENGES OF CLIMATE CHANGE 77 (1998).
149 See Stockholm Declaration, supra note 147. The idea of permanent sovereignty over
natural resources was endorsed by the General Assembly in 1962 and was again endorsed,
although in very different terms, in 1973. See Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty Over
Natural Resources, G.A. Res. 3171, U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp. No. 30, at 52, U.N.
Doc. A/9030 (1974), 13 I.L.M. 238; Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Re-
sources, G.A. Res. 1803, U.N. GAOR, 17th Sess., Supp. No. 17, at 15, U.N. Doc. A/5217
(1963), 2 I.L.M. 223. All of the Warsaw Pact U.N. member states abstained from voting
on the 1963 Resolution and the Stockholm Declaration. See Stephen M. Schwebel, The
Story of the UN.'s Declaration on Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, 49
A.B.A.J. 463 (1963); BURNS H. WESTON, ET AL., BASIC DOCUMENTS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER 943 (1990). All of these states (as well as
East Germany, which had become a U.N. member in the interim) voted in favor of the
1973 Resolution. The Stockholm Declaration was adopted by a vote of 103-0, with 12 ab-
stentions. (No roll call vote was recorded.)
150 Stockholm Declaration, supra note 147, Principle 21.
151 The Helsinki Rules, 52 [.L.A. 484 (1967).
From Schweizerhalle to Baia Mare
tional drainage basin. 152 Among the factors to be used in deter-
mining what is reasonable and equitable, are the economic and
social needs of each state,'53 the population in each basin state de-
pendent on the waters of the basin,54 and the degree to which
waste and unnecessary injury can be avoided.'55
The first of these factors seems to weigh on the side of Roma-
nia because of its great need for development. The Aurul mine,
for example, provided 3,000 desperately needed jobs in Baia
Mare. 56 The others, though, favor the injured lower riparians.
Two million Hungarians drew drinking water from the Tisza, and
the cost of protective measures - higher and better-constructed
tailings dams - would have been relatively slight.
The Helsinki Rules use a "substantial injury" standard to de-
termine whether a state's use of water is reasonable and equita-
ble. "'57 Article X of the Rules prohibits "any new form of water
pollution or any increase in the degree of existing water pollution
in an international drainage basin which would cause substantial
injury in the territory of a co-basin State. . . "' Article XI pro-
vides that a polluting state must cease the polluting activity and
compensate the injured state. 59 The injury to the Tisza, and thus
to Hungary and perhaps Yugoslavia, was certainly "substantial,"
and both countries have announced their intention to seek com-
pensation."w
c. The World Charter for Nature
The World Charter for Nature (in actuality, merely a General
Assembly resolution) provides that "States... shall... [e]nsure
that activities within their jurisdictions or control do not cause
damage to the natural systems located within other States or in
152 Id. art. IV.
153 See id. art. V(2)(e).
154 See id. art. V(2)(f).
155 See id. arts. V(2)(i), V(2)(k).
156 Anca Paduraru, Baia Mare: Romania's Polluted City, AP, Mar. 11, 2000, available at
2000 WL 15788674.
157 See The Helsinki Rules, supra note 1511, art. V(2)(k).
158 Id. art. X(1)(a). The International Law Association also addressed transboundary
pollution generally in The ILA Rules on International Law Applicable to Transfrontier
Pollution, Sept. 4, 1982,60 I.L.A. 157 (1983).
159 See The Helsinki Rules, supra note 151, art. XI.
160 See Agence Fr.-Presse, Belgrade Demands Compensation from Romania over Cya-
nide Spill, July 11, 2000, available at 2000 WL 2833272; Agence Fr.-Presse, Greenpeace
Protests Outside Firm Involved in Danube Pollution, Mar. 22, 2000, available at 2000 WL
2758151.
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the areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.... , This
duty to other states, expressed in language similar to that of the
earlier Stockholm Declaration and the later Rio Declaration, is
then countered by a recognition that the Declaration takes "fully
into account the sovereignty of States over their natural resources
.... "162 The significant substitution of "natural systems" for "en-
vironment" might imply liability even in the absence of economi-
cally quantifiable harm. In the Baia Mara and Baia Borsa spills,
of course, both quantifiable economic harm and intangible harm
to "natural systems" are present.
d. The Rio Declaration
Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration 163 is identical to Principle 21
of the Stockholm Declaration, with the exception of two added
words:
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Na-
tions and the principles of international law, the sovereign
right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own en-
vironmental and developmental policies, and the responsibility
to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do
not cause damage to the environment of other States or of ar-
eas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.'
64
'those two added words ("and developmental") shift the balance
between territorial sovereignty and territorial integrity toward the
former, favoring developing nations and upper riparians (in this
case, Romania). The Rio Declaration does, however, require en-
vironmental impact assessment 165 and "prior and timely notifica-
161 World Charter for Nature, Oct. 28, 1982, G.A. Res. 37/7, Annex, art. 21(d), U.N.
GAOR, 37th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 17, U.N. Doc. A/37/51, 22 I.L.M. 455 (1983). The
World Charter for Nature was adopted by a vote of 111 countries for to one (the United
States) against, with 18 abstentions (mostly Latin American countries, plus Algeria and
Lebanon). Later the U.N. Secretariat was informed that Mexico had intended to vote in
favor of the resolution. See id. at 455.
162 Id. art. 22.
163 See Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, June 13, 1992, (vol. i) 31
I.L.M. 874, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (1992), [hereinafter Rio Declaration].
164 Id. Principle 2 (emphasis added). The added words reflect the major concern of the
Rio Conference: balancing developing nations' needs against the environmental concerns
of the developed countries. While the added words would seem to indicate that Romania
can place a high priority on development if it wishes, Romania still has an obligation to
ensure that the activity causes no harm to Hungary.
165 See id. Principle 17.
[Vo .19:43145r 4
2000] From Schweizerhalle to Baia Mare 455
tion to... potentially affected states .... ,166
e. The United Nations Convention on the Non-Navigational Uses
of Transboundary Watercourses
Despite having been adopted by a General Assembly vote re-
corded as 103 to 3, with 27 abstentions and 33 members absent,
67
the Convention on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of Interna-
tional Watercourses'61 cannot be said to reflect customary interna-
tional law. The high number of abstaining states, and the signifi-
cant concerns expressed by some of the supporting states, suggest
166 Id. Principle 19.
167 U.N. GAOR, 51st. Sess., 99th Plenary Mtg., July 8, 1997, U.N. Doc. AIRES/51/229,
36 I.L.M. 700 [hereinafter Non-Navigational Uses Convention]; General Assembly Adopts
Convention on Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, May 21, 1997,
U.N. Press Release GA/9248, at 1, 7-8, available at http://www.un.org/News/briefings/
[hereinafter GA/9248]. Romania, Ukraine, Slovakia and Hungary all voted in favor of the
Convention. Id. Although the Convention could also have been discussed alongside the
Espoo Convention, it seems more appropriate to discuss it as a purely aspirational docu-
ment. See Espoo Convention, supra note 1266. By its terms, the Convention will not enter
into force until "the ninetieth day following the date of deposit of the thirty-fifth instru-
ment of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession with the Secretary- General of the
United Nations." The deadline for the deposit of such instruments is May 21, 2000. To
date, only seven have been deposited (by Finland, Hungary, Jordan, Lebanon, Norway,
South Africa, and Syria). Seven other countries (Cote D'Ivoire, Germany, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, Paraguay, Portugal, and Venezuela) have signed but not ratified. See Con-
vention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, May 21,
1997, available at http://untreaty.un.org/.
168 For a description of the history of the ILC deliberations on the Draft Articles, see,
inter alia, Peter Fischer & Gerhard Hafner, Aktuelle osterreichische Praxis zum Volker-
recht/Recent Austrian Practice in International Law, 36 OSTERR. Z. OFFENTL. RECHT UND
VOLKERRECHT 365, 417-22 (1986); Stephen C. McCaffrey, An Update on the Contribu-
tions of the International Law Commission to International Environmental Law, 15 ENVTL.
L. 667, 670-78 (1985); Stephen C. McCaffrey, International Organizations and the Holistic
Approach to Water Problems, 31 NAT. RESOURCES J. 139, 150-60 (1991); Stephen C.
McCaffrey, The International Law Commission Adopts Draft Articles on International
Watercourses, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 395 (1995) (noting that final adoption of the Draft Arti-
cles was completed at the ILC's 1994 session); Stephen M. Schwebel, First Report on the
Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses [1979], 2(1) Y.B. Int'l
Comm'n 143, 150-59, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1979/Add.1; Stephen M. Schwebel, Sec-
ond Report on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses [1980],
2(1) Y.B. Int'l Comm'n 159, 160-67, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1980/Add.1; Ludwik A.
Teclaff, Fiat or Custom: The Checkered Development of International Water Law, 31 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 45, 71-73 (1991); The Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International
Watercources, 3 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 1, 18-27, 32-36 (1992). To review a
history of the International Law Commission's drafting of the Convention, see generally
Draft Articles on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses,
July 19, 1991, Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Forty-third
Session, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 161, U.N. Doc. A/46/10 (1991) [herein-
after ILC Draft Articles].
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that the Convention does not represent conventional wisdom.69
Romania and the downstream states affected by the Baia Mare
and Baia Borsa accidents, however, all voted in favor of the Con-
vention, and may consider it an accurate statement of their rights
and responsibilities under international law. Like the U.N. Con-
vention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Water-
courses and Lakes, the Non-Navigational Uses Convention
adopts an "equitable use" approach. 7 Like the Danube Pro-
tection Convention, it requires that such use be (or attempt to
be) sustainable. 7'
Under the Non-Navigational Uses Convention, Romania
would have had an obligation not to cause significant harm to
its downstream neighbors.7 2 Once such harm occurred, Roma-
nia would then have been obligated to take "all appropriate
measures.., to eliminate or mitigate such harm and, where ap-
propriate, to discuss the question of compensation."'7
Protection of water for drinking, fishing, and agriculture might
take priority over mining uses. As the Convention states, "In the
event of a conflict between uses of an international watercourse,
it shall be resolved.., with special regard being given to the re-
quirements of vital human needs." 'I Part III of the Convention
(Planned Measures) would have required Romania to notify, con-
sult, and negotiate with the lower riparians when planning activi-
ties such as the Aurul tailings operation, that had the potential to
adversely affect the lower riparians.175 Finally, the Convention
provides detailed dispute settlement procedures.'76
IV. THE FUTURE OF EUROPE'S INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES
The treaty regime protecting the Danube basin has proved
inadequate, just as the Rhine treaty regime proved inadequate
in 1986. Under the current system, whenever northern Roma-
nia experiences heavy flooding, the Tisza will be endangered.
169 See generally Aaron Schwabach, The United Nations Convention on the Law of Non-
Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, Customary International Law, and the
Interests of Developing Upper Riparians, 33 TEXAS INT'L L.J. 257 (1998).
170 Non-Navigational Uses Convention, supra note 167, art. 5(1).
171 See id. art. 5. See also Danube Protection Convention, supra note 97.
172 See Non-Navigational Uses Convention, supra note 167, art. 7.
173 Id. art. 7(2).
174 Id. art. 10(2).
175 See id. arts. 11-19.
176 See id. art. 33.
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There are signs, however, that the situation along the Danube
will improve. Just as the Sandoz spill focused attention on the
Rhine, the Baia Mare spill has focused international attention
on the Danube and its tributaries. The Debrecen agreement is
an encouraging sign. In addition, it should be noted that the le-
gal structures protecting the Danube - especially the Danube
Protection Convention and the International Commission for
the Protection of the Danube - are very new. The Romanian
spills have provided the current protective regime with its first
real test, which it seems to have passed. All of the actors, in-
cluding Romania, seem genuinely committed to addressing the
situation.
However, two major problems remain. The first is the eco-
nomic and political inequality that exists along the Danube; the
second is that solving the problems of the Danube will not solve
the problems of other rivers.
A. Inequality Along the Danube
Economic and political inequality was not present along the
Rhine in 1986. The riparian states of the Rhine are all wealthy,
developed, democratic countries. Most are members of what is
now the European Union. Those that were not members (Swit-
zerland, Liechtenstein, and Austria) were thoroughly integrated
into the Western capitalist economy and, while theoretically
neutral, clearly aligned with the West during the Cold War era.
All the riparian states of the Rhine had been at peace both in-
ternally and with each other for decades.
A similarly benign situation does not exist along the Danube.
The riparian states include wealthy states such as Germany and
Austria (also Rhine riparians), as well as impoverished, war-
torn states such as Yugoslavia. While all of the riparian states
are nominally democratic, the degree of individual liberty and
participation in the political process varies greatly between
them.
In such a situation, it is inevitable that some wealthy demo-
cratic states will attempt to export their environmental prob-
lems to poorer (and sometimes less democratic) ones. Austria,
for example, after environmentalists prevented the building of a
hydroelectric power plant in a nature reserve within Austria,
helped finance the controversial Gabcikovo-Nagymaros project
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in exchange for a promised share of the electricity to be gener-
ated.177 Similarly, European Union countries refuse to allow
cyanide heap leaching in their own territory, yet permit the pur-
chase of metals obtained by the same process in other coun-
tries.
18
Another Danubian problem not present along the Rhine in
1986 is the desperate poverty of some of the lower riparians.
Romania (which is an upper riparian on the Tisza and a lower
riparian on the Danube itself) has an annual per capita gross na-
tional product (GNP) of $1,600. This falls somewhat lower than
the GPA of El Salvador. 179 In stark contrast, Hungary's annual
per capita GNP, at $4,340, is nearly three times as high. Ger-
many's, at $28,870, is more than eighteen times as high.8 0 Bul-
garia and Ukraine are even worse off than Romania.' While
no reliable information -is currently available for most of the
states of the former Yugoslavia, it seems safe to conclude that
economic conditions there are truly desperate.
Given such disparities, wealthier states (including non-
riparians such as Australia) will continue to fund environmen-
tally undesirable projects in the poorer riparian states. In Ro-
mania, for example, both the government and the people seem
committed to environmental protection. At the same time,
however, Romania cannot afford to turn away foreign investors
offering jobs and development. The problem can only be ad-
dressed by adopting and enforcing stringent environmental
safeguards.
The regulations must be adopted and enforced either by the
investing country (which, in this case, would be Australia), or by
the country hosting the investment (which, in this case, would
be Romania). There are problems with both approaches. Aus-
tralia, like most other developed countries, has been unwilling
to apply its environmental standards to activities of its citizens
abroad.'82 While a change would be welcome, such a strategy
would only become effective when adopted by nearly all in-
vesting states.
177 See Diverting the Danube, supra note 74, at 297.
'7 See Id.
179 See THE WORLD BANK, 1998 WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS 12-13 (1998).
180 See id. As recently as 1992, an incredible 70.9% of Romanians lived on less than $2
per day. See id. at 65.
181 See id. at 12-14.
182 See supra notes 54-58, and accompanying text.
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At the same time, Romania may feel that it cannot afford to
adopt environmental regulations as stringent as Australia's or
the European Union's. A mining operation, for example,
would be far cheaper in Romania, even applying Australian en-
vironmental standards, than in Australia. Other developing
countries, though, might compete to make themselves more at-
tractive to investors by offering lower environmental protection
costs.
As with the problem of extraterritorial application of domes-
tic environmental laws, this problem cannot be solved on a
global scale until nearly all of the investment-receiving coun-
tries agree on some uniform standards. However, the problem
can be solved on a local scale. The effective enforcement of
some internationally determined minimum level of environ-
mental standards in the Danube basin would prevent a "race to
the bottom" in environmental standards among the developing
riparians, while leaving developed riparians free to set higher
standards.
Political and diplomatic obstacles to achieving such uniform-
ity also exist. Along the Danube, the major obstacle of this na-
ture is the continuing isolation of Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia re-
mains the recipient, rather than the source, of many of the
Danube's problems. Within Yugoslavia, the river has suffered
both from the Romanian spills and from the war with NATO,
two of whose members (Germany and Hungary) are Danube
riparians.183 However, activities in Yugoslavia have enormous
potential to cause harm to other riparians.
This is not to suggest a general rapprochement with Yugosla-
via.184 However, those riparians situated downstream from
Yugoslavia - especially the major riparians, Bulgaria and Ro-
mania - can only be harmed by excluding Yugoslavia from the
Danube treaty regime. The ideal solution would be a rehabili-
tated Yugoslavia. However, in the interim provisional steps to
183 For a discussion of the environmental effects of the war with NATO, see Aaron
Schwabach, Environmental Damage Resulting from the NATO Military Action Against Yugoslavia, 25
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 117 (2000).
184 On the legality of the humanitarian intervention in Kosovo, see Julie Mertus, Recon-
sidering the Legality of Humanitarian Intervention: Lessons from Kosovo, 41 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1743 (2000); Aaron Schwabach, Yugoslavia v. NATO, Security Council
Resolution 1244, and the Law of Humanitarian Intervention, 27 SYRACUSE J. INT'L. L. &
COM. 77 (2000); Abraham D. Sofaer, International Law and Kosovo, STAN. J. INT'L L. 1
(2000); Aaron Schwabach, The Legality of the NA TO Bombing Operation in the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia, 11 PACE INT'L L. REV. 405 (1999).
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ensure Yugoslavia's cooperation must be taken.
B. Saving Europe's Other Rivers
The other problem, emphasized by the fourteen years be-
tween Schweizerhalle and Baia Mare, is that international envi-
ronmental law tends to grow in reaction to catastrophic inci-
dents that capture international headlines. Most environmental
harm, however, is caused by activities that are routine, quotid-
ian, and dull; they do not capture the public imagination, and
thus do not evoke the same level of regulatory response.
International environmental law is thereby distorted. After
the horse has gone, rule-makers and the public install new locks
on the stable door, pat themselves on the back, and go on to
something new. Chronic polluting activity is often overlooked,
as is the possibility of similar disasters elsewhere.
In the aftermath of Schweizerhalle, the Rhine riparians suc-
ceeded in saving the Rhine. In the aftermath of Baia Mare, the
riparian states will probably succeed in saving the Tisza and the
Danube. Europe, however, has many other vulnerable interna-
tional river basins. The Dniester, the Dnieper, the Volga, the
Don, and the Oder, among others, are all endangered.'
It would be unfair to say that in the aftermath of the Rhine
disaster nothing was done to protect Europe's other rivers. The
U.N./ECE Convention on the Protection and Use of Trans-
boundary Watercourses and International Lakes was adopted six
years after the accident. 186 The U.N. Convention is a step in the
right direction. More generalized global conventions, such as the
Non-navigational Uses Convention, tend to be less useful, since
the problems of river basins are, by their nature, local problems
rather than global ones. The difference in the nature of water-
courses, their ecologies, and the political and economic nature of
the states lying within their basins makes universal rulemaking
impossible. Detailed, specific plans would be necessary for an in-
ternational agreement to be effective. However, it would be hard
to imagine that anything other than the most basic principles
could be equally applicable to the Amazon, the Nile, the Colum-
bia, the Rio Grande, and the Danube.
Within Europe, there is still enormous political, economic, and
185 See, e.g., JONI SEAGER, THE NEW STATE OF THE EARTH ATLAS 54-55 (2' ed. 1995)
(map).
l86 See U.N. Convention, supra note 96.
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environmental diversity among river basins. The U.N. Conven-
tion is a good beginning that also exhorts its parties to further
their efforts.87 The Baia Mare and Baia Borsa spills highlight the
need, at least within Europe, for continuing efforts to develop in-
ternational legal structures to protect the waters of specific indi-
vidual drainage basins.
187 See id. pmbl., art. 9.
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